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Abstract:
This  paper  considers  the  latest  developments  in  an  ongoing 
attempt to restructure the English working class. It divides this 
project  into  two  distinct  phases.  The  first  is  associated  with 
destructive  policies  to  undermine  the  political,  social  and 
institutional structures of the working class embedded in the post-
War social democratic and compromise. The paper then goes on 
to show how New Labour initially sought to rebuild the working 
class in the image of global competitiveness, at the outset of the 
second phase to restructure the English working class.  The paper 
argues that the present moment in policy development represents 
a watershed in this second-phase. The aim now is to contain and 
overcome some of the contradictions thrown up by New Labour’s 
early policies and to raise the raise the workforce in terms of its 
position in the Global Division of Labour. To do so, there is a need 
to move up those sections of the working class currently working 
in, and competing for, low-value and low paid ‘entry-level’ work, 
in order to create space for largely inactive elements of the latent 
workforce to move into. The project is pre-figured by a wholesale 
acceptance  of  the  politics  of  global  competitiveness.  The 
discussion is undertaken via an analysis of three key sets of policy 
documents associated with the Harker Review of Child Poverty, 
the Leitch Review of Skills and the Freud Review of Welfare.
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Restructuring the English Working Class for Global 
Competitiveness1
Introduction
Previous papers in this series have identified the broad ideological framework 
underpinning  the  New  Labour  Project  (NLP)  (Cammack,  2007)  and  the 
institutional,  social,  economic and political  trajectory of reform (Nunn, 2007). 
The  latter  paper  argues  that  the  NLP  can  be  seen  as  a  second  phase  in 
neoliberalism  characterised  by  a  shift  from  the  attempts  in  first-phase 
neoliberalism to dismantle the legacy social and institutional structures of social 
democracy towards a revised social and institutional structure which can support 
neoliberal  accumulation  over  the  long-term.  A  core  theme  in  first-phase 
strategies was the launching of an attempt to restructure the working class. The 
aim was to remove the social and institutional framework supporting the working 
class and to expose it to increasing competition, through integration in the global 
division of labour. However, these efforts were only partly successful and left the 
NLP  confronting  two distinct  barriers  to  competitiveness.  These were first,  a 
demand for additional labour power to be available for commodification, even if 
left temporarily unutilised, to allow for the expansion of absolute surplus value 
generation; and second, a demand to ensure higher levels of skills and therefore 
productivity, to enable increased relative surplus value generation. These two 
demands left the NLP tackling two policy problems left over by the destructive 
impacts of first-phase restructuring: significant problems of long-term ‘economic 
inactivity’ and disengagement from the formal labour market (what would later 
be termed ‘worklessness’) and significant sections of the economy engaged in 
low productivity and low value-added production. 
Throughout the NLP, Gordon Brown has been at the centre of  the domestic 
policy agenda aimed at tackling these problems (Nunn, 2006). However, three 
key policy  reviews of  child  poverty (Harker, 2006),  skills  (Leitch,  2006)  and 
welfare reform (Freud, 2007), and the response of central government to these 
(DWP, 2007; 2007a; DIUS, 2007), which broadly coincided with Brown’s long 
accession to the leadership of the NLP sketch out the trajectory of future reform, 
1  An earlier version of this paper was presented to the ESRC/UN Seminar on Changing 
Cultures of Competitiveness at Lancaster University, January 2008 
(http://www.lancs.ac.uk/fass/events/changingcultures/seminars/seminar1.htm).  I am 
grateful for comments from participants at the seminar and from Paul Cammack.
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or the next stage of the project to restructure the working class. The central 
argument of this paper is that the policy framework that emerges from these six 
documents marks an intensification of New Labour’s attempts at remaking the 
English working class into a globally competitive workforce, capable of sustaining 
a  lofty  position  in  the  global  division  of  labour  by  satisfying  the  needs  of 
Neoliberal accumulation. The paper will  demonstrate this argument principally 
through a detailed discussion of the six documents associated with the three 
reviews and the government’s response to them.
Restructuring the Working Class
Previously, I have argued that the NLP is characteristic of a second phase in the 
construction of neoliberal hegemony, consisting of five distinct spheres: ideology, 
institutions, social  and labour market organisation, the organisation of capital 
and  the  construction  of  supportive  political  alliances  (Nunn and Price,  2005; 
Nunn, 2006; 2007). The development of  the second phase was shaped by a 
commitment  to  neoliberal  globalisation,  coupled  with  a  serious  attempt  to 
confront  some of  the challenges posed by incomplete and stalling first-phase 
reform. In particular, following an ideological commitment to Giddens’ Third Way 
and Neo-Schumpeterian economic strategies (Jessop, 2007), the NLP aimed to 
invest in the social and institutional infrastructure to facilitate competitiveness. 
Interestingly, this is in line with the broader shift in policy frameworks designed 
to embed neoliberalism at a global level,  where there has now been a long-
running commitment to tackling some of the negative implications arising from 
first-phase  restructuring  (Cammack,  2001;  2002;  Craig  and  Cotterell,  2007; 
Nunn, 2005). 
This  paper  focuses  on  the  evolution  of  neoliberal  reform  within  the  social 
sphere. Here I have previously argued that social reform has emphasised two 
distinct  problems faced by the UK economy. First  was a need to expand the 
supply of labour power to cope with the tightening labour market and to facilitate 
expanded  accumulation  through  tackling  the  long-term  unemployment  and 
economic inactivity. Second, was a marked commitment to improving the skills of 
the workforce in  order to render the UK able to compete in the increasingly 
competitive global division of labour (Nunn, 2007:11-14). It is worth pausing 
here to consider briefly the origins of the problems facing New Labour and their 
construction  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  class  structure  of  contemporary 
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England.2
There has been much political and media interest recently in the subject of the 
class structure and how this has changed over recent decades, particularly as 
regards the scope for mobility within the structure (Nunn et al., 2007:10-11). 
Studies since the 1980s have noted the changing occupational composition of the 
labour market as a result of industrial restructuring dating back to the 1970s and 
have  posited  this  as  a  changing  class  structure  with  the  proportion  of  the 
workforce engaged in ‘middle’ class administrative occupations increasing at the 
expense of manual occupations in primary and manufacturing industries (e.g. 
Halsey et al., 1980; Heath, 1981; Heath and Payne, 1999; Green, 2003). More 
recent  studies  show  that  this  trend,  while  still  underway  in  many  parts  of 
Western Europe (e.g. Breen, 2004; 2004a), may be nearing its completion in the 
UK (Goldthorpe, 2004). 
While often presented as advantageous, this shift is also associated with several 
negative  implications.  First,  has  been  a  rising  wage  and  status  differential 
between those who have successfully made the jump to relatively secure and 
well  paid service sector employment and those that are left  behind in  either 
residual  ‘un-skilled’  manual  occupations  or  relatively  low-status  and  insecure 
service  sector  employment  (Goos  and  Manning,  2003;  2003a).  Second,  the 
impact of increasing insecurity as a result of labour market flexibility has been 
felt most acutely by those in these lower-status occupations (Gallie, 1998; 2002) 
with a significant low pay-no pay cycle resulting in cyclical poverty (Smith and 
Middleton, 2007).
The third consequence of industrial restructuring saw significant proportions of 
the  population  left  behind  altogether, especially  geographically  concentrated 
communities  associated  with  primary  or  Fordist  manufacturing  industries. 
Coupled with this, the growth of home ownership among those sections of the 
working class able to take advantage of opportunities in the expanding service 
sector led to the concentration of those who were less successful in public and 
social  housing  (Nunn  et  al.  2007:65-66;  Hills,  2007:86-111).  As  individuals, 
2  Much the same analysis can be applied to the rest of Britain, and indeed the UK. The 
rationale  for  restricting  the  analysis  to  England only  resides  in  the  more complex 
patchwork of policy responsibility which arises from devolution to Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland and the need to frame subsequent discussion in the context of the 
remit of the Harker, Leitch and Freud reports whose recommendations are relevant to 
these  countries  but  whose  implementation  requires  a  different  configuration  of 
institutional responsibility.
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families and whole communities moved rationally to exploit the benefit system, 
often aided by sympathetic workers in the public employment service (Catalyst, 
2002; Nunn, 2006a), and governments played politics with the unemployment 
statistics  (National  Audit  Office,  1989),  significant  pockets  of  ‘hidden 
unemployment’ and long-term economic inactivity emerged (Beatty et al. 2002; 
Beatty and Fothergill, 2002; 2004).
Of course, the restructuring of the UK economy was not the result of benign 
economic  trends  that  happened  to  carry  unfortunate  ‘negative  externalities’. 
Rather, considerable political agency was exerted in the process, including the 
consciously designed destruction of the structure of the post-war working class. 
This  included  a  three-pronged  attack  on  the  power  of  the  working  class 
expressed organizationally in the trade unions, electorally in the Labour party 
and institutionally  through the nationalised and large-scale  Fordist industries, 
corporatist  bargaining  processes  and  the  welfare  state.  A  key  strategy  in 
undermining  these  structures  was  Thatcher’s  programme  of  welfare  reform, 
regulation of the Trade Unions, privatization of the nationalised industries and 
engineering  of  unemployment  in  ‘cold  bath’  labour  market  policies  (Gamble, 
1990:198; Overbeek, 1990).
Thus the NLP’s early attempts at engineering a transformation of the English 
working class emerged in the wake of the implications of a preceding attempt to 
change the class structure to meet  the needs of  Neoliberal accumulation.  As 
such, it is possible to suggest that where Thatcher’s attempts to deconstruct the 
legacy structures of the post-war working class constituted the first part of the 
overall project to restructure the working class, New Labour’s early attempts to 
confront the problems thrown up by this inaugurated a second part. The paper 
now turns to what might be regarded as a watershed in this second part; the 
apparent intensification of the social reform process of restructuring the working 
class that lays ahead.
Making the Working Class Competitive
Before reviewing the three sets of policy reviews and government responses on 
which this paper centres, it is worth noting their timing and the context within 
which  they  were  undertaken  and  published.  The  subject  matter  of  all  three 
reviews has long been a central concern of  Gordon Brown. While Brown was 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Treasury would regularly identify the barriers to 
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high  productivity  growth  posed  by  unemployment  and  low  or  insufficient 
workforce skills, for instance in the ten documents in the productivity in the UK 
series3 or regular joint publications and strategy documents with other ‘spending’ 
departments  such  as  the  Department  for  Trade and  Industry,  the  various 
incarnations of the Department for Education and the Department for Work and 
Pensions.4 While the Harker, Leitch and Freud reviews were all commissioned in 
advance of Brown becoming Prime Minister, they all address concerns that are 
closely associated with his personal political agenda. In addition, the government 
responses to the Leitch and Freud reports were both published within weeks of 
his becoming Prime Minister. The strong impression is, therefore, that the six 
documents provide a reliable guide to the trajectory of  policy under the NLP 
headed by Brown.
There  is  also  scope  to  argue  that  the  six  documents  mark  something  of  a 
watershed in the evolution of the NLP. For instance, while the concern with both 
skills and productivity on the one hand and worklessness on the other is nothing 
new, the joining of these two agendas together is significant in its implications 
for the objective of transforming the working class. The shift in emphasis from 
‘work  first’  to  a  balancing  concern  with  ‘sustainability’  and  ‘progression’  is 
particularly noticeable.  What is  important is  that the definition of  sustainable 
employment takes shape within  an overall contextual  analysis  of  competitive 
globalisation. As such, what is really meant by ‘sustainability’ is competitiveness 
within the global division of labour, for those sections of the workforce concerned 
with goods and services that can be traded (as a part or finished product) and 
competitiveness domestically (including with migrant labour) for those that are 
concerned with more spatially constrained goods and services. It is in this light 
that the three sets of documents are reviewed below.
The Harker Review of Child Poverty
The issue of child poverty has received high profile treatment within the NLP. The 
2000 Spending Review established a headline Public Service Agreement (PSA) 
target  to  eradicate  child  poverty  by  2020.  The  target  promised  an  interim 
3 http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/documents/ 
enterprise_and_productivity/the_evidence/ent_prod_index.cfm
4 The Department for Employment and Education, the Department for Education and 
Skills and now split between the Department for Children, Schools and Families and the 
Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills. 
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reduction of the number of children living in households with income below 60% 
of the median income5 by a quarter by 2004 (HM Treasury, 2000:Ch14). When it 
became clear that the 2004 target would not be met, the Treasury undertook a 
wide  ranging review of  the  policies  needed to  meet  the  longer-term targets 
involving  wide-ranging  consultation  with  stakeholder  groups  and  considering 
policy across all government departments. The review, published just over a year 
later  in  July  2004  alongside  the  Spending  Review,  suggested  that  the 
comparatively high rates of child poverty in the UK were due to
demographic changes, in particular a growth in the number of lone 
parent  families;  a  concentration  of  worklessness  among  low-skilled 
households; and a widening wage distribution with increased in-work 
poverty and weaker work incentives (HM Treasury, 2004:15).
While the substantive sections of the review drew attention to the wide range of 
government policy  areas,  departments and agencies that  might  contribute to 
combating child poverty (HM Treasury, 2004:19-84), the final conclusion focused 
in on the need to promote employment as the most effective route out of poverty 
for parents and their families (HM Treasury, 2004:85). The review suggested a 
new three tier  definition of  child  poverty to reflect  absolute and relative low 
income alongside other measures of material deprivation (DWP, 2003).
Despite the optimism of the 2004 review, by 2006 it became clear that progress 
against the child poverty target continued to lag expected levels (Palmer et al. 
2006).  At  this  point  the  then  Secretary  of  State  for  Work  and  Pensions 
announced that child poverty would move to being the central priority of  his 
department. In a speech to the Fabian Society he rolled out the familiar NLP 
arguments that ending poverty was a precursor to economic competitiveness, 
that paid employment is the most effective means of moving out of poverty and 
that this is properly the responsibility of individuals themselves, with the state 
taking on the role of enabling individual competitiveness in the labour market. He 
also  stressed  the  continuing  concern  with  tackling  long-term  inactivity, 
identifying the apparent paradox of worklessness co-existing with high levels of 
labour  market  demand.  However, the  speech  also  aired  two  relatively  new 
concerns: first, to improve levels of upward social mobility and second to address 
issues of in-work poverty, potentially questioning the validity of the ‘work first’ 
approach (Hutton, 2006a). A month later, Hutton announced the appointment of 
5 The chosen indicator of relative poverty. This is used in the annual Households Below 
Average Income report, (e.g. see DWP, 2007b).
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Lisa Harker to review “the department’s policies and to help progress towards the 
ambitious target of eradicating child poverty by 2020” (DWP, 2006a). Harker, 
former  Director  of  the  New Labour  think-tank the  Institute  for  Public  Policy 
Research,  qualified  her  report  (Harker, 2006)  at  the  outset  as  having  been 
constrained by the limited time available. However, the preface suggests that she 
is confident that the report provides 
guidance on:
 What it would take to reach the 2010 Child Poverty target and 
get on track for meeting the 2020 target;
 How much more can be achieved through Welfare to Work 
programmes  and  what  contribution  various  reforms  could 
make; and 
 The gap that needs to be met by other policies (p5).
In explaining the contemporary child  poverty problem in the UK,  the report 
draws attention to the continuing affects of first-phase restructuring:
Changes during the 1980s, when the gap between rich and poor grew 
faster in the UK than almost any other industrialised country, are still 
reflected  in  the  shape  of  our  society  today.  Despite  significant 
increases in support for families with children in recent years, income 
inequality  remains  high,  driven  by  high  levels  of  wage and wealth 
inequality. The  benefits  of  our  rich  society–  in  the  distribution  of 
income  and  employment  opportunities  –  are  not  evenly  shared 
(Harker, 2006:7).
However, by contrast with the 2004 review, Harker also draws attention to the 
weaknesses of second-phase NLP strategies, particularly the work first approach 
which underpinned social and welfare policy and the failure to seriously tackle 
inequality, as the last part of the quotation above suggests. She goes further, 
specifically  suggesting that a continuation of  the ‘work first’  Welfare to Work 
strategy would be unlikely to lead to the reductions in child poverty promised in 
the PSA target (14):
The contribution that employment has made to reducing poverty since 
1997  has  decreased  over  time.  Indeed,  while  substantial  gains  in 
employment were seen between 1997 and 2001, since 2001 most of 
the fall in child poverty can be attributed to increases in tax credits. 
Continuing  with  current  Welfare to  Work policy  is,  therefore,  very 
unlikely to achieve a significant reduction in child poverty by 2010 or 
2020. 
In moving the debate forward, Harker continues, with added emphasis, some 
key themes from second-phase strategies in the NLP. For instance, she continues 
to  centre  on  the  problem  of  tackling  long-term  economic  inactivity  and 
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particularly focuses on removing barriers to the labour market access of parents, 
through acknowledging the importance of female participation. The direct result 
of these strategies is to argue in favour of replacing decommodified domestic 
labour overwhelmingly performed by women, with commodified domestic labour 
(likewise most often performed by women) in the form principally of childcare 
but also other domestic services. At the same time, additional labour power is to 
be realised through the process of commodifying and creating economies of scale 
in childcare tasks in particular. 
However, here, as on other issues, she goes further. Harker suggests that if a 
general transformation of the ways in which family structures (of both the one 
and two-parent varieties) relate to the labour market is to be brought about, the 
same measures as are extended to lone parents (almost always assumed to be 
women)  need  to  be  addressed  to  all  families,  and  the  partners  of  benefit 
recipients (whether male or female) need to be subject to similar encouragement 
to  move into  work.  As such,  she  suggests  an intensification  of  the effort  to 
render  both  men  and  women  equal  in  front  of  capital  in  their  attempts  to 
compete to sell their labour power:
By viewing jobseekers’ needs in the context of their family, advisers 
would be able to support both jobseeker and his or her partner, with no 
presumption about who should go into work first. This would help to 
encourage each member of a couple to achieve his or her potential and 
enhance individual  autonomy and life  chances for  women and men 
(18).
This approach includes, as did the Child Poverty Review before it, increases in 
the  amount  of  market-based  childcare  available  to  facilitate  parental  labour 
market participation (25). 
However, as suggested above, Harker also breaks with earlier NLP approaches 
which  focus  predominantly  on  work.  She  explicitly  criticises  the  ‘work  first’ 
approach, suggesting that it focused too intensively on labour market attachment 
and not enough on skills acquisition to facilitate  sustainable entry into higher 
quality employment and also progression within the labour market (36). It is on 
this issue that the watershed within the NLP is most evident. Work-first welfare 
to work policies are suggested, often implicitly, to have resulted in large numbers 
of people being pushed toward low quality employment. This is a critique that 
has  been  levelled  elsewhere  at  the  impact  of  this  process  on  employers’ 
motivations to invest in training, capital  modernisation or workforce retention 
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(Policy  Research  Institute,  2006:95).  Harker  identifies  these  effects  with 
continuing in-work poverty as a constraint on efforts to reduce child poverty. She 
then  uses  this  as  the  justification  for  abandoning  the  simplistic  ‘work  first’ 
message and moving toward a ‘work first plus’ package of active labour market 
policies which include an upfront work focus but also incorporate an emphasis on 
up-skilling and progression from ‘entry level’ employment to more sustainable 
employment  in  more  competitive  occupations  and  industrial  sectors  (Harker, 
2006:37-52). Notably, and potentially putting her at odds with some of the wider 
thinking  about  welfare  reform in  the  NLP, Harker  explicitly  rules  out  further 
conditionality for lone parents. 
The Leitch Review of Skills
Improving the skills base of the workforce in order to enhance social inclusion 
and competitiveness is a central pillar of the NLP and has been from the start. In 
2004 though, Brown, as Chancellor, outlined in his pre-budget report statement 
the need to go further:
For  decades  low  skills  have  been  our  ‘Achilles Heel’  as  a  modern 
economy – and the post war ‘laissez faire’ training system has not, and 
will not, meet the skills needs of the future….
…Britain’s  future  as  a  productive  nation  depends  upon  a  shared 
determination - from parents and teachers to management and trades 
unionists  -  that  the acquisition of  skills  by all  and their  continuous 
upgrading is a shared national purpose. And in furtherance of this, the 
Education Secretary and I have asked the Chairman of the National 
Employment Panel Sandy Leitch to build on today’s decisions, report on 
the long term skills needs of the economy including for intermediate 
and  degree  level  skills,  and  work  with  employers  to  ensure  every 
employee is offered new opportunities (Brown, 2004).
The Pre-Budget Report (HM Treasury, 2004a, esp. Chapters 3, 4 and 5) itself 
and  the  associated  report  published  on  the  same  day,  Skills  in  the  Global 
Economy  (HM Treasury, 2004b),  both  laid  out  the  skills  challenge in  familiar 
terms:  the  problems  facing  the  UK  economy  in  the  future  were  about 
commodifying more labour power through drawing excluded groups back within 
the scope of the formal labour market and raising their relative productivity once 
in it through skills enhancement. Skills in the Global Economy also sets out what 
became a central and notable feature of the subsequent Leitch review: that the 
productivity and competitiveness challenge is a national one that should be taken 
on not by government alone but in combination with employers and individuals 
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themselves:
There is much to do to equip Britain’s workforce for  the future, so 
today  we  ask  employers,  unions,  individuals,  schools,  colleges, 
universities to keep working closely with government so that together 
we can meet the challenges ahead (HM Treasury, 2004b: Foreword).
While this  focus has always been part  of  the NLP, the two year long Leitch 
Review of  Skills  is  widely  regarded  in  the  public  sector  as  something  of  a 
watershed in the development of the intensity of the skills theme in the NLP, 
especially in further emphasizing the economic basis for education and training. 
The review produced two weighty documents, the first (published in 2005) being 
a description of the context of competitiveness and the second setting out how 
policy  should  be  developed  to  meet  the  competitiveness  challenge.  The 
discussion below focuses on the second report, published in December 2006.
The  Leitch  Review starts  from the  problematic  of  contemporary  patterns  of 
globalization  and  increasing  competitiveness  among  both  advanced industrial 
economies and emerging market economies alike.
The rapid growth of emerging market economies, including China and 
India,  is  shifting  the  global  balance  of  economic  activity. By  2015, 
China is likely to have become the third largest economy in the world, 
after the US and Japan. This creates new markets for UK firms and 
provides cheaper goods for UK consumers. It also means the UK will 
have  a  decreasing  share  of  output  in  the  sectors  in  which  these 
countries  have a  comparative advantage.  To maintain  and  improve 
growth, the UK must manage the resulting domestic structural change, 
allowing workers and resources to shift to more productive activities 
and sectors. This structural change is contributing to growth of high 
skilled jobs in the UK. To adapt to it the UK needs more highly skilled 
workers (Leitch, 2006:32).
This structural change is changing the skills demands of employment even in 
relatively low-skilled sectors in the UK, especially in service sector occupations 
requiring a physical presence, including those that have grown as a result of 
existing  trends  to  replace  de-commodified  domestic  labour  with  commodified 
services:
The shift in low-value added production to emerging economies does 
not necessarily mean that demand for relatively low skilled workers will 
continue to fall. Rather, the type of demand at the lower end of the 
labour market is shifting further towards service sector jobs, such as 
hospitality and personal service work (ibid: 33).
In  this  context,  the  Review identifies  two  particular  issues  that  need  to  be 
tackled  to  enhance  competitiveness.  The  first  includes  skills  development  to 
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enhance  relative  productivity.  The  second  includes  tackling  a  complex 
employment  challenge  which  arises  from  comparatively  high  levels  of 
employment in international terms, coinciding with equally comparatively high 
levels of long-term economic inactivity and the persistence of low-productivity 
and low quality employment (28-32). Skills, therefore take on the role as the 
main  agent  in  addressing  worklessness,  low-productivity  and  insecure 
employment and of driving competitiveness and innovation growth at the upper 
reaches of the labour market. Skills are the new welfare and the missing variable 
in economic growth:
[I]n  the  new  global  economy…skills  are  an  ever  more  important 
determinant of productivity, prosperity and business competitiveness. 
As  the global  economy integrates and  technology breaks down the 
barriers  between  what  can  and  cannot  be  traded,  activities  will 
increasingly be located according to comparative advantage. The UK’s 
comparative advantage cannot and should not come from low labour 
costs alone. Instead it must come from the skills of its people. In the 
new global economy, the UK can only achieve world class prosperity 
through world class skills. … As the global economy changes, skills will 
be an increasingly important driver of employment. Economic security 
will  depend not on protecting particular jobs. Instead, ensuring that 
peple are able to stay in the labour market, equipped with the skills 
and flexibility to find their next job and build their career, will be key to 
their security. The focus of welfare policy must shift from protecting 
people  from  change  to  ensuring  people  can  adapt  to  change.  A 
platform of skills will help people to find and stay in work. Providing 
opportunities to improve skills will help people advance in work (ibid: 
30-31.).
Leitch’s suggested response to this is four-fold. First, institutional simplification 
is needed to ensure greater clarity of organisational roles. This is then matched 
with a commitment to ‘demand-led’ skills provision, getting away from unreliable 
forecasting of future skills needs and giving employers a much enhanced position 
within the network of skills governance at a national (through the Commission 
for Employment and Skills (77)), sectoral (through revised Sector Skills Councils 
(78-9)) and local level (through Employment and Skills Boards (234)). He also 
suggests  that  by  giving  employers an enhanced role,  skills  provision can be 
‘depoliticised’ and the approach locked-in over the medium term (until 2020 at 
least):
Establishing the employer-led Commission, will help to ‘depoliticise’ the 
skills agenda by securing a broad political and stakeholder consensus 
for the UK’s world-class ambitions for 2020 and beyond. This will allow 
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the UK to take a clearer, long-term view of its employment and skills 
needs towards 2020 (ibid: 77).
These governance innovations are matched by a commitment to lever up basic 
skills,  especially through working with the existing workforce, and to link the 
skills  and welfare systems more closely, allowing a path from unemployment 
through to relatively secure working class employment. Overall, enhanced skills 
provision is the objective across all levels of the labour market but with a market 
failure  model  helping to  allocate responsibility  for  this.  As such,  the state is 
expected to assume the burden at the lower levels of the labour market, with 
employers and individuals identified as being increasingly responsibility at higher 
levels.  Across all  levels,  skills  are deemed to  be important,  but  the focus is 
principally  on  ‘economically  valuable  skills’  with  qualifications  and  provision 
associated with skills not fulfilling this description being de-prioritised (79-85). 
The  general  policy  framework proposed  by  Leitch  again  suggests  significant 
themes of continuity with earlier NLP strategies, principally the pursuit of a highly 
qualified workforce to promote flexibility as a means of securing competitiveness 
in the global economy. However, it also marks an intensification of the project 
with a new emphasis on shifting specific social groups upward within the class 
structure  by  linking  skills  and  welfare  provision  and careers  advice,  creating 
space within the active but unemployed tier of the labour market for currently 
inactive groups to occupy. It also marks an intensification of the effort to position 
other parts of the UK workforce at a higher point within the global division of 
labour. It is therefore possible to argue that the recommendations of the Leitch 
Review  are  securely  embedded  within  the  intensification  of  second  phase 
attempts to make the English working class competitive in global terms. 
What is also notable is the recourse to governing strategies which are used 
elsewhere in second-phase neoliberalism, including within the NLP. These include 
the  attempt  to  broker  and  utilise  relative  autonomy  to  design  a  long-term 
political project within which both capital and labour are expected to cooperate. 
For  its  part,  capital  is  expected  to  cooperate  by  accepting  responsibility  for 
designing  skills  provision,  and  for  training  and  providing  opportunities  to 
progress within their occupational structures, at the same time lifting their own 
competitive ambitions and re-organising production so that enhanced skills can 
be utilised to realise productivity growth. 
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The UK will not reap the benefits from a world class skills base…unless 
the skills delivered are the ones employers and individuals need and 
businesses want, and know how to use effectively in the workplace 
(ibid: 89).
As  such,  management  skills  to  get  the  maximum  productivity  are  to  be 
strengthened (89-92). For their part, individuals are encouraged to transform 
their attitude to learning, accepting responsibility for their own up-skilling and 
skill  up-dating  throughout  their  lifetime.  Again,  suggesting  considerable 
leadership among a relatively autonomous political class, this is reported as no 
less than ‘embedding a culture of learning’:
Individuals  will  have to be part  of  a new, shared national  mission, 
engaging in learning and investing where it will improve their pay and 
job prospects... (ibid: 103).
This  is  not  purely  rhetorical  flourish.  The  commitment  is  matched  to  a 
sophisticated  understanding  of  individual  behavioural  motivations  which  is 
increasingly understood as beyond the constraints of rational economic man (for 
instance,  see  Talbot,  2007).  As  such,  influencing  individual  behaviour  is 
increasingly seen as part of the governing strategy of the NLP (Knott et al. 2007; 
Cabinet  Office,  2007;  2007a)  and  Leitch’s  recommendations  take  on  this 
objective in a set of proposals to raise individual aspirations and to inform and 
motivate  choices  to  enable  individuals  to  realistically  pursue  these  (Leitch, 
2006:105-116). As a result, the Review also focuses on motivating individuals to 
take responsibility for transforming their own behaviour as part of the attempt to 
re-make the working class as a whole.
The Freud Review of Welfare
The final of the trio of major policy reviews to be considered here is the Freud 
Review of Welfare, which was announced by the Secretary of State for Work and 
Pensions, John Hutton in December 2006. Responding to both the Leitch and 
Harker Reviews and drawing heavily on the text of the 1944 Beveridge Report, 
Hutton argued that the Review should focus on the design and delivery of welfare 
reform  and  in  particular  on  how  this  could  address  continuing  challenges 
associated with worklessness and economic insecurity among those repeatedly 
cycling between low-paid work and unemployment (Hutton, 2006).
Unlike the Leitch Review, which took two years of consultation and two reports, 
the welfare reform review commissioned from David Freud (former international 
Banker, Financial Times Journalist and adviser to the government on the Channel 
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Tunnel, and great grandson of Sigmund Freud)6, proceeded at breakneck speed, 
producing a final report by March 2007. Questions could be posed regarding the 
independence of  this  review, conducted as it  was in  a short  time frame and 
without  the  principal  author  having  any  obvious  previous  expertise  in  social 
policy. This is especially the case since some aspects of the trajectory of welfare 
reform had already been set by the 2006 Green Paper (DWP, 2006) and the 
subsequent 2007 Welfare Reform Act. The thrust of the Green Paper and the Act 
was to revise the system of benefits provided to inactive claimants, creating a 
new single benefit and claim system (the Employment Support Allowance) and 
placing a much stronger emphasis on work (through the roll-out of the Pathways 
to  Work scheme),  with  an enhanced role  for  the  health  system in  providing 
assistance to  identify  what work people with  incapacities  can do rather than 
corroborating their inability to work. 
The Freud Review (Freud, 2007) builds on the changes to the inactive benefit 
system and the findings of the Leitch and Harker Reviews. It begins from the 
same starting point as the other reviews: that much has been achieved in social 
reform and outcomes by the NLP but more remains to be done, if worklessness 
and low skills are not to be allowed to continue to inhibit competitiveness:
The openness and flexibility of the UK economy has presented labour 
market opportunities for many individuals. It has also created specific 
challenges  for  individuals  with  no  or  low  skills.  The  global  labour 
market  is  expanding  at  an  unprecedented  rate  and  parts  of  the 
economy, particularly the service economy, are likely to be exposed to 
international competition to an extent that they have not been before. 
In short, in an increasingly global economy a failure to tackle low skills 
could damage the UK’s competitiveness and entrench poverty (Freud, 
2007:26).
The logic for reform is thus set out as three-fold: as enhancing competitiveness 
(26-8); as benefiting the exchequer (and thus tax payers) (67-75); and as being 
in the interests of workless people themselves as a result of the much vaunted 
‘health and well being’ benefits of employment (45-9). On this last point, Freud 
cites (45) a widely publicised synthesis of research undertaken by Waddell and 
Burton (2006)7 which reviews evidence of the links between work and well-being. 
While  Waddell  and  Burton  find  overwhelming  evidence  of  the  benefits  of 
6 Biographical details were drawn from Freud's 2006 book,  Freud in the City (Freud, 
2006).
7 It is notable that the press release accompanying Waddell and Burton’s report focuses 
overwhelmingly on the undoubted benefits of work. 
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employment for heath, their report also highlights some of the negative impacts 
of poor quality employment: 
the provisos are that account must be taken of the social context, the 
nature and quality of work, and the fact that a minority of people may 
experience contrary effects. Jobs should be safe and should also be 
accommodating  of  sickness  and  disability  (Waddell  and  Burton 
2006:38). 
These are considerable provisos given the social  context and quality of work 
available to people making the transition from long-term unemployment, and the 
fact that Waddell and Burton’s definition of the type of work that is beneficial 
includes the importance of fair pay, control and autonomy, job satisfaction and 
security (ibid: 34-5), all of which are questionable in ‘entry’ level employment. 
Freud  also  unquestioningly  accepts  the  government’s  ‘aspirational’  80% 
employment rate target. In order to achieve this, he suggests that Welfare to 
Work services need to be differentiated not on the basis of the traditional ‘client 
groups’  (such  as  young  people,  older  people,  short-term unemployed,  lone-
parents,  and  disabled  people)  but  between  those  experiencing  short-term 
unemployment and those who are long-term unemployed and face serious or 
multiple barriers to work. While the former group should remain the focus of the 
public employment service, the latter group are to be diverted to private sector 
agencies who are to be offered increased flexibility and enhanced payments to 
tackle these barriers (52-65). Freud also suggests that, in the future, contracts 
with private providers should included long-term (three year) payment structures 
to  support  ‘sustainability’  and  progression.8 He  also  suggests  enhanced 
conditionality for some groups, such as lone parents, with the expectation of 
availability for work starting when the youngest child is aged 12 rather than 16 
as at present (77-95).
Freud’s  recommendations  are  again  in  line  with  the  intensification  of 
restructuring the second phase of the project to remake the working class. The 
focus is on designing interventions designed to tackle the problem of many job 
seekers cycling between low quality work and unemployment in order to shift this 
section of the working class into more globally competitive positions: hence the 
focus on sustainability. At the same time this is intended to create the room for 
currently workless groups to move into the gap, competing to offer their labour 
8 Current contracts with sustainability payments have generally stopped at 13 weeks 
which  is  often  not  long  enough to  support  long-term returns  to  work  (see  Policy 
Research Institute, 2006).
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for  commodification.  Nothing  in  the  Freud  report  looks  toward  engaging 
employers in  improving the quality  of  employment or  its  security, much less 
towards regulation or legislation for this. This is despite the explicit proposal to 
persuade and cajole employers to invest in skills provision in the Leitch report. 
The implication of this is therefore not so much that poor quality or insecure 
work  will  disappear  (especially  in  sectors  or  functions  that  cannot  be  traded 
internationally) but that the degree of competition in this sector of the working 
class  will  change,  as  people  move  into  it  from  previous  situations  of 
worklessness.
Of  course,  tackling  the  profound and multiple  barriers  many people  face  to 
gaining employment is to be welcomed, as these present significant individual 
and social problems. But it is revealing that the primary motive emphasised by 
Freud  is  to  expand  the  proportion  of  the  population  whose  labour  can  be 
commodified,  reducing  the  fiscal  drain  on  revenues  and  enhancing 
competitiveness. It is further revealing that the proclaimed benefits of work are 
emphasised much more than the equally widely noted deleterious effects of poor 
quality and insecure work.
Again, there are also elements of continuity with earlier NLP strategies. The 
focus on privatisation and creating a huge new market for commodified service 
provision  is  notable  here  and  is  an  extension  of  current  practice  in  various 
aspects of New Deal provision, Employment Zones and Working Neighbourhoods 
pilots.  Indeed,  Freud,  as  might  be  expected  from  a  successful  city  banker, 
explicitly notes this as an aim of his recommendations:
The scale of the potential market is large. Once it matures, it will be 
made up of the flow of new hard to help clients from Jobcentre Plus. In 
the early years it could be further swollen as existing customers on 
incapacity benefits participate in work related activity. Based on the 
analysis in this report I have no doubt that this will be an annual multi-
billion pound market (Freud, 2007:75).
The emerging response
The response to the Harker, Leitch and Freud reports give a strong indication of 
the future trajectory of both the NLP and the project to remake the working 
class.  In  broad  terms the  recommendations  of  the  three  reviews  have been 
unhesitatingly  accepted.  Certainly  the  background  contextual  analysis  and 
rationale  for  action  are  accepted  wholesale;  unsurprising,  given  the  Gordon 
Brown’s frequent previous urging of the need for competitiveness and the social 
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change required to achieve this (e.g. Brown, 2005). 
The  response  to  the  Harker  Review was  the  publication  of  a  revised  Child 
Poverty Strategy, Working for Children (DWP, 2007) in March 2007. The report 
performs a largely ‘holding’ function with little in terms of decisive new policies or 
initiatives. It largely confines itself to discussing measures already announced 
(such as the extension of childcare through the roll-out of children’s centres or 
extended hours care in schools) or evidence about the potential success of pilots 
such as the high profile Employment Retention and Advancement Demonstration 
and the extension of the pilot in-work credit scheme, both of which offer financial 
incentives for lone parents (among others) to move into and stay in work. The 
only  note  of  significance  in  the  report  is  the  inference  of  the  government’s 
preference  for  Freud’s  recommendation  that  conditionality  should  be 
strengthened for lone parents after the youngest child reaches twelve (rather 
than  the  current  sixteen)  against  Harker’s  much  softer  incentive-based 
arguments (21).
It is perhaps unsurprising that the response to the Harker review took such a 
cautious line.  Published in  March 2007, it  appeared shortly  before Tony Blair 
formally announced his resignation in early May, but after it had become clear 
that  his  Prime Ministership  was drawing to  a close.  By contrast,  the Welfare 
Reform Green Paper In Work, Better Off: Next Steps to Full Employment, and the 
Leitch Review implementation plan both published on the same day a matter of 
weeks after Gordon Brown became Prime Minister, are much more forthright in 
setting out the broad parameters and direction of future policy development. The 
Ministerial Foreword to the Welfare reform Green Paper by the newly appointed 
Secretary of State Peter Hain suggests that:
This Green Paper delivers a step change in the employment and skills 
support we offer to those who are most disadvantaged in the labour 
market… it reinforces our strong commitment to the values of equality 
and  opportunity,  and  to  the  principle  of  rights  matched  by 
responsibilities, with work for those who can and security for those 
who can’t. 
Likewise the Leitch Implementation Plan, World Class Skills, also promises to be 
a watershed and again the Foreword, signed off  by no less  than six cabinet 
ministers, undertakes to deliver a ‘step change’ but this time this not only in 
relation  to  government policy  and  public  service  provision,  but  to  the  wider 
culture within the workforce and among employers (DIUS, 2007:5). 
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Both the Welfare Green Paper and the Leitch Implementation Plan accept the 
main conclusions from the Leitch and Freud reviews. In the case of the response 
to Leitch this relates to the need to improve the skills of the working population 
in order to cope with the dynamic context of competitive globalisation. The first 
two paragraphs of the foreword make this clear:
It used to be that natural resources, a big labour force and a dose of 
inspiration  was  all  that  was  required  for  countries  to  succeed, 
economically.  But  not  any  more.  In  the  21st Century, our  future 
prosperity will depend on building a Britain where people are given the 
opportunity and encouragement to develop their skills and abilities to 
the maximum… (DIUS, 2007:3).
The first paragraph of the executive summary of  World Class Skills continues 
this thrust, explaining that the reforms set out in the document are intended to 
“sustain  and  improve our  position  in  the  global  economy” (9).  With  Leitch’s 
depiction of the context accepted, the report moves onto its main mission, to 
bring about a culture change where individuals and employers fully accept the 
responsibility  for  joining  with  government  in  an  attempt  to  increase 
competitiveness. The message is clear: for those already in the labour market 
this alone is not enough. What is needed is a working class which, once actively 
engaged in the formal labour market, is then committed to playing its own part 
in raising the rate of surplus value. Nor can employers rest on their laurels; they 
must work to enhance their competitiveness by committing to raise the capacity 
of the labour power they exploit to generate higher rates of relative surplus:
This  document  sets  out  the  practical  reforms  that  we  will  be 
introducing in England to spark of this ‘skills revolution’…Changing the 
culture  in  this  country  in  relation  to  skills  is  at  the  heart  of  that 
revolution. We need to embed the value of skills in our culture in a way 
it never has been before. We need individuals to feel that it is their 
responsibility  to  improve their  skills  throughout  their  working lives, 
because the benefits that will  bring for them and their families. We 
need employers to take responsibility for the skills of their employees, 
because of the increased productivity and profitability that investing in 
skills will deliver. And when they do take that responsibility, they need 
to know that Government accepts its responsibility to support them 
(DIUS, 2007:7).
This culture change is to be achieved at all levels of the workforce. Towards the 
bottom of the class structure, the intention is to foster engagement with training 
to improve employability, overcome barriers to active labour market participation 
and to become competitive in seeking work (DIUS, 2007:22-23). Here In Work, 
Better Off takes up the baton. It is largely concerned with advancing the existing 
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agenda  (for  instance,  reform  of  incapacity  benefits)  on  tackling  long-term 
inactivity  but  also  introduces  a  predominantly  new  emphasis  on  resolving 
difficulties associated with the low pay-no pay cycle. Here the challenge is to 
move  toward  the  government’s  ‘aspirational’  80% employment  target  (DWP, 
2007a:8). In contrast to Freud, the report argues that there is a continued need 
to target specific groups such as the long-term sick, lone parents, older people, 
ethnic minorities, people in very deprived inner-city areas and the low skilled 
(DWP, 2007a:25-28).  The  objectives  of  welfare  reform  are  to  be  achieved 
through  increased  partnerships,  with  service  providers  offering  guaranteed 
recruitment and pre-employment screening and training matched to the needs of 
large  scale  employers,  in  return  for  their  commitment  to  offer  jobs,  work 
experience and further training and development to people who have been out of 
work for long-periods or who have additional support needs (DWP, 2007a:31-
37):
We expect individuals to take advantage of all the opportunities open 
to them to prepare themselves for work. This may mean undertaking 
short, work-focused skills training to improve their employability… in 
return  individuals  can expect  to  be  helped to  prepare for  and find 
appropriate jobs…we would like employers to consider disadvantaged 
customers  for  their  vacancies  and  in  return  they  will  get  help  in 
identifying and preparing the right people for  those vacancies. This 
might mean committing to work trials, providing suitable induction and 
technical  training  for  individuals  without  the  appropriate  work 
experience;  and  considering  employee  mentoring.  Those  who 
successfully  complete  a  pre-employment  programme  would  be 
guaranteed job opportunities. We may also ask employers to review 
their  job  application  processes  and  flexibility  of  employment,  to 
support  fairer  and  more  inclusive  recruitment  practices  (DWP, 
2007a:32).
In addition, the report promises additional conditionality for Lone Parents and 
others not taking sufficient ‘work related activity’, with additional payments for 
this as well as a strengthening of in-work financial support and childcare, and the 
expansion of in-work payments to other families with children (DWP, 2007a:41-
54). Here the emphasis is on recognising poverty traps, as indeed the creation of 
the in-work tax credit system9 did, and diverting public funds toward subsidising 
low-pay  for  certain  groups,  the  result  being  to  enhance  competition  for 
employment.  The  Green  Paper  also  largely  goes  along  with  Freud’s 
9 Initially  introduced  by  the Conservative governments  of  the  1990s  in  the  form of 
Family Credit  and then changed and expanded several times by labour as various 
forms of ‘tax credits’.
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recommendations regarding contracting out public employment services for the 
longer-term (over 12 months) unemployed and those with entrenched barriers to 
work, the implication being to commodify employment services (DWP, 2007a:57-
65).
The thrust of the Green Paper is to encourage both capital and labour to act in 
more competitive ways. Individuals are to be assisted in improving their own 
capacity to compete for work, by tackling their barriers to employment. Financial 
impediments  associated  with  differential  costs  of  going  to  work,  such  as 
childcare, are to be ironed out through public subsidy, allowing individuals with 
these costs to compete more effectively to sell their labour against those who do 
not. Capital is to be encouraged, through state absorption of much of the costs 
and some of the risks of recruitment, to improve its practices, specifically by not 
discriminating  against  those  with  chequered  employment  history, women  or 
ethnic minorities, thereby allowing labour to compete on a more equal basis for 
employment. This is all an extension of what has gone previously. However, the 
emphasis on integrating welfare support with more proactive skills provision may 
have the implication of an ‘escalator effect’ whereby those engaging at the lower 
end of the labour market move up to higher-value added activity enabling others 
who  have been inactive to  fill  the  gap  they  leave, for  instance  through the 
creation  of  a  new adult  careers  service.  Overall,  the  plan  appears  aimed  to 
increase both absolute and relative surplus value generation through expanding 
the  scope  of  the  formal  labour  market  at  the  same  time  as  increasing 
productivity.
Conclusion
The first phase of the project to restructure the working class was concerned 
with  dismantling  pre-existing  social  and  institutional  supports  of  the  social 
democratic and corporatist compromise. It involved casting organised labour out 
of the national policy making coalition. It also involved undermining the popular 
and  workplace  power  of  the  highly  unionised  male  working  class  working  in 
primary  and  Fordist,  and  often  state  owned  or  controlled,  industries.  These 
elements of the working class were subjected to ‘cold baths’, stripped of either 
their job or their job security and measures were taken to integrate them more 
fully in the global division of labour, though imperfectly as it turned out. This 
much is all well documented and can be placed in the context of attempts to 
build first-phase neoliberal hegemony. 
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The  second  phase  of  the  project  acknowledges  the  considerable  crisis 
tendencies  inherent within first-phase strategies and seeks to  offset  these in 
order  to  embed  and  sustain  neoliberal  accumulation  for  the  long-term.  This 
second phase has been implemented in the UK by the New Labour governments 
that have been in power since 1997. Indeed, so deeply intertwined have these 
successive governments been that the implementation of second-phase reform 
can justifiably be defined as the New Labour Project. 
This project initially sought to tackle the social problems faced by the incoming 
administration  while  accepting,  unchallenged,  the  ‘reality’  of  increasing 
globalisation,  an  increasingly  developed global  division  of  labour  and  greater 
international  competition.  In  this  context,  the  ultimate  goal  was to  create  a 
working class that could compete towards the higher end of the global division of 
labour. This meant both increasing the skills base of the employed workforce and 
expanding the scope of labour market participation, recognising the hindrance to 
competitiveness and  productivity  posed by  long-term unemployment  and low 
skilled and low-value added employment. 
However, attempts to tackle these problems were fragmented. A consequence of 
this has been that while the overall employment rate has risen markedly many of 
those that have re-entered the labour force, or at least active job search, have 
been ‘shovelled’ into low value added work. The resulting low pay–no pay cycle 
has  allowed  employers  to  continue  with  short-term  practices  that  are  not 
sustainable – read competitive - in the context of longer-term competitiveness 
challenges. The ready supply of new labour from employability programmes has 
been a disincentive to substituting capital for labour and reorganising their own 
practices  for  enhanced  competitiveness.  As  the  employment  rate  has  risen, 
employers  have  continued  to  report  difficulties  in  accessing  sufficient  labour 
power (known as ‘Hard to  Fill  Vacancies’) or  sufficiently  skilled  labour power 
(known as Skills Shortage Vacancies) (though these are not necessarily currently 
rising  –  see  LSC,  2007).10.  Additionally,  there  is  a  recognition  that  the 
effectiveness of existing strategies, policies and programmes, such as the New 
Deal,  may  have  peaked.  A  residual  long-term  unemployed  –  workless  – 
population remains. While some sections of this element of the working class 
10 The emerging results from the National Employer Skills Survey show a small decline in 
hard to fill  vacancies in  2007 though this  could  be due to  the  slight  downturn in 
demand over the period surveyed.
21
have been able to benefit from the support available to enable them to compete 
more effectively to sell their labour power, those with multiple or more profound 
‘barriers to work’ have not yet made this transition. 
As  a  consequence  of  these  difficulties,  a  shift  has  taken  place  towards 
addressing the low pay–no pay cycle and the more profound barriers facing the 
residual  workless  population.  It  attempts  an  ‘escalator  effect’  to  raise  those 
currently in low level employment and active job search (and cycling between 
these positions) into more competitive positions in the global division of labour, 
thereby leaving a gap into which the currently workless can move. This group is 
then to be the subject of much more strenuous efforts to tackle their barriers to 
work, including attempts to resolve institutional inertia through contracting with 
the private sector.
This  is  reflected  in  the  replacement  of  Incapacity  Benefit  with  the  new 
Employment Support Allowance to be introduced in 2008, and the roll-out of the 
‘Pathways to Work’ scheme designed to ‘encourage’ long-term inactive benefit 
claimants to move first toward management of their health conditions, second 
toward active job search and third toward employment. The future development 
of the project has been mapped out through the Harker, Leitch and Freud reports 
and the government’s responses to them, and consolidated in the White Paper 
issued  in  March  2008,  Raising  Expectations:  enabling  the  system  to  deliver 
(DIUS, 2008). This places responsibility for coordination and the commissioning 
of provision upon local authorities, and involves not just working to expand the 
workforce (and thus the extent of absolute commodification) on the one hand 
and  to  increase  productivity  (and  thus  the  rate  of  relative  surplus  value 
generation) on  the  other. It  involves joining  these  two efforts  together. This 
involves a coordinated strategy to deal  with the problems left  unresolved by 
successive  attempts  to  redesign  the  English  working  class.  The  approach  to 
welfare policy in relation to worklessness and child poverty then is married to the 
Leitch agenda precisely because this is the link that can enable the other two to 
enhance competitiveness. What is distinctive about the intensification of second 
phase  strategies  is  the  determined  attempt  to  wrestle  with  problems  of 
sustaining and progressing in the labour market once people gain ‘entry’ level 
work. The joining of the welfare and skills agendas together is an attempt to 
create an ‘escalator’  effect  whereby skills  provision can lift  individuals out  of 
entry level work into more competitive occupations and sectors which are located 
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within the global division of labour, rather than the domestic service sector. The 
underlying logic appears to be that this then will create the space for currently 
workless individuals to move into the vacated ‘entry’ level employment. However, 
much will depend on the implementation of these policy goals if this ‘escalator’ 
effect is to be successful (Nunn and Johnson, 2008) in shifting the UK workforce 
higher up the global division of labour as envisaged, and it remains to be seen on 
how the low-pay problem in domestically contained and routed service industries 
(personal  and  domestic  services  and  the  like)  will  be  tackled  (Palmer et  al. 
2007:10).  The responses to Harker, Freud and Leitch are so far sketchy and 
despite a rash of new publications (DWP and DIUS, 2007; DWP, 2008; DWP, 
2007c; 2007d), it is not yet clear whether this new effort will succeed. It does 
now appear  that  local  authorities  will  be  called  upon to  play a  leading  role, 
absorbing the work of the Learning and Skills Council in the process. But whether 
the result  will  be to push the unemployed and workless towards increasingly 
productive employment or into poor quality and poorly paid jobs remains to be 
seen.  If  the  latter, then  the  whole  strategy  is  likely  to  be  highly  counter-
productive and fail to enhance competitiveness.
This paper presents an initial analysis of the intensification of aspects of the 
second  phase  in  the  restructuring  of  the  working  class  under  conditions  of 
neoliberal capitalist hegemony.  It is based largely on a re-interpretation of the 
policy  intentions set  out  in  key policy  documents.   However, the project  will 
require further study, continuing to focus on the policy intentions spelled out in 
the current rash of policy papers on reform of the skills and welfare systems.  It 
will  also  require  detailed  analysis  of  implementation  plans  and  progress  to 
uncover  the  internal  consistency  of  the  project  from  intention  through  to 
implementation  and  further  a  detailed  analysis  of  the  impact  of  efforts  to 
restructure the working class within the context of a broader global project to 
secure  neoliberal  capitalist  hegemony  through  the  politics  of  global 
competitiveness.
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